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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HUNTER-TANNERSVILLE TEACHERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6 57 6 
HUNTER-TANNERSVILLE CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Charging Party. 
HARRY W. FAIRBANK and KEVIN BERRY, for Respondent, 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK. ESQS. (JAMES P. BURNS, 3d. and 
JOHN J. McCANN. ESQS.. of Counsel), for Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Hunter-Tannersville Central School District (District) to a 
decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge against the Hunter-Tannersville Teachers' Association 
(Association). The charge alleges that the Association refused 
to negotiate pursuant to a reopener clause dealing with health 
insurance.— The ALJ determined that the Association's 
•i/At an earlier stage of this proceeding, a hearing 
officer had dismissed the charge on the ground that there 
was no clear reopener and. therefore, the charge was one of 
contract enforcement over which subject matter jurisdiction 
did not lie. We reversed the hearing officer's decision on 
the ground that, in its pleadings, the Association had 
acknowledged that it had agreed to a contract negotiation 
reopener. and we remanded the matter to the ALJ. 
16 PERB 1f3109 (1983). The decision now before us is that 
of the ALJ upon remand. 
9401 
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conduct fulfilled its obligations under the reopener and, 
therefore, satisfied its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
FACTS 
The "reopener" clause of the parties' agreement 
provides that the Association and the District shall meet 
to examine insurance coverage offered by companies other 
than the carrier. It further provides for a committee to 
consider alternative health coverage, including 
self-insurance and. "[i]f the committee finds and agrees to 
a different bona fide [plan offering comparable coverage,] 
. . . it will be adopted". 
An 11-person committee was appointed consisting of 2 
representatives of the District, 5 of the Association, 2 of 
other units, 1 retired teacher and 1 person whose reason 
for being on the committee is not stated. The District 
asserts that it submitted information to the committee 
indicating that the "Catskill Self-Benefits Program" 
provides health coverage comparable to that provided by the 
existing program. 
The record shows that the committee met five times. At 
the early stages the parties explored both insurance and 
self-insurance alternatives to the existing program and. 
according to the District's own witnesses, the Association 
representatives appeared enthusiastic about finding an 
- 94 
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alternative to the existing plan. However, when it 
appeared that no insurance carrier alternative would 
provide significant savings, the interest of the District 
focused upon self-insurance, and the Association 
representatives lost their enthusiasm for the work of the 
committee. Their further participation consisted of 
efforts to demonstrate the inadequacy of self-insurance 
plans. 
The District then invited representatives of the 
Catskill program to make a presentation at a meeting of its 
Board of Education, and it urged the committee members to 
attend. The Association members did so reluctantly, and 
asked no questions of the "Catskill Program" representatives. 
The District asserts that this is evidence of a closed mind and 
surface bargaining. When, at the next meeting of the committee, 
the District asked the committee to vote on the "Catskill 
Program", the Association members refused to do so and the 
committee process collapsed. There were a couple of subsequent 
meetings between the Association and the District but the 
parties did not reach any agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
The District's first argument is that the Association 
was obligated to evaluate alternative health insurance 
programs and to approve an alternative if it would provide 
- 940; 
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protection comparable to the existing program. Thus, 
according to the District, the Association violated its 
duty to negotiate by not approving the "Catskill Program" 
when it had demonstrated that the program would provide 
coverage at the existing level. The ALJ rejected this 
argument on the ground that the duty to negotiate does not 
contemplate that a party is required to agree to any 
substantive program on the basis of a showing that the 
program meets predetermined standards. We agree. To the 
extent that such an obligation might be imposed by the 
parties' former agreement, it is not a Taylor Law duty to 
negotiate but a substantive contractual requirement which 
2/ 
we may not enforce.— 
The District's alternative argument is that the 
performance of the Association members on the committee 
evidenced a closed mind and constituted surface 
bargaining. 
We find that the parties never engaged in Taylor Law 
negotiations over alternative health insurance options; 
instead, the District merely initiated a contractually 
provided committee process which did not constitute 
negotiations. Not having been called upon to negotiate, i 
follows that the Association did not violate its duty to 
negotiate in good faith. 
2/see §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law. 
- 94 
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Furthermore, even if we were to treat the committee 
meetings as negotiations, the evidence shows that the 
Association members entered the process with an open mind, 
but became disillusioned as the position of the District 
narrowed. Moreover, as time passed both the District and 
the Associat-ion became less inclined1 to compromise. 
Accordingly, we would conclude that the Association's 
participation in the committee meetings satisfied any duty 
3/ to negotiate in good faith.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: December 14, 1984 
Albany, New York 
1/We do not, of course, reach the question whether, 
as asserted by the District, the parties' agreement merely 
imposed upon the committee a mechanical function of 
determining whether a specific change in health insurance 
was mandated by ascertainable conditions. Such a function 
would not constitute negotiations within the meaning of 
§204.3 or §209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law in that the parties 
would lack the discretion to grant or withhold agreement. 
Accordingly, we do not consider whether the Association 
members of the committee failed to perform such a function. 
//2B-12/14/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOCES FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7309 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL.SERVICES. 
Charging Party. 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD. ESQ. (HAROLD G. BEYER, JR.. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
PLUNKETT & JAFFE. P.C. (JOHN M. DONOGHUE and 
ROCHELLE J. AUSLANDER. ESQS.. of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was brought by the Dutchess County Board 
of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES). It complains that 
the Dutchess County BOCES Faculty Association. NEA/NY 
(Association) violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by 
insisting upon the negotiation of a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation in that it presented its demand to a fact 
finder.— The Association does not contest the allegation that 
it has insisted upon the negotiation of the demand in question, 
but it asserts that the demand is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
j/Rockville Centre Principals Association. 12 PERB If3021 
(1979). 
r mv 
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The contested demand is for seniority in selection of 
assignments. It includes a series of procedural proposals 
about which BOCES does not complain. BOCES objects, however, 
to that part of the demand which provides: 
If more than one (1) teacher has applied for 
th^ same position, the teacher best 
qualified for that position shall be 
appointed, and qualifications being 
substantially equal, seniority in the school 
system shall usually control. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that the demand 
constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiation, and the 
matter now comes to us on BOCES' exceptions. 
BOCES argues that the assignment of teachers is a 
management prerogative because Education Law §1711.5.e 
authorizes a school superintendent to transfer teachers. It 
also finds support for its position in Sweet Home CSD. 
90 A.D.2d 683 (4th Dept. 1982). aff'd. 58 N.Y.2d 912 (1983). 
The provisions of Education Law §1711.5.e authorizing a 
school superintendent to transfer teachers is not dispositive 
of the question whether seniority as a standard for such 
transfers is a mandatory subject of negotiation. The general 
rule is that a public employer must negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment, the determination of which it could 
have made unilaterally but for the enactment of the Taylor 
«• 9407 
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Law. UFSD No. 3. Huntington v. Associated Teachers of 
Huntington. 30 N.Y.2d 122, 5 PERB ir7507 (1972).-/ Only 
where a statute or public policy intends such determinations 
to be the nondelegable responsibility of the public employer 
are such negotiations prohibited. Susguehanna Valley CSD v. 
Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Assn.. 37 N.Y.2d 614, 
8 PERB T7515 (1975) M 
BOCES' reliance upon Sweet Home CSD is for the 
proposition that the assignment of teachers is. by virtue of 
statute or public policy, a nondelegable responsibility. 
That case, like the one before us, involved the assignment of 
a teacher. There, the school district involuntarily 
transferred a music teacher from one position to another in 
violation of a contractual provision. The arbitrator issued 
an award which had two parts. The first required the 
District to follow the procedural rules specified in the 
^Ordinarily, it is where statutory mandates deprive 
a public employer of discretion to act that negotiations 
are not mandated. Thus, proposals regarding maternity 
leave were held nonmandatory because statutory mandates of 
the Human Rights Law covered the matter at issue. City of 
Rochester. 12 PERB 1F3010 (1979). 
1/cohoes City School District v. Cohoes Teachers' 
•hear, &n M V O A Tl A Q PFIPR « ? t ; 9 Q fTQ1f,\ n i t o r l h v 'RDCRS 
in support of the proposition that the assignment of 
teachers is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation, merely 
holds that the award of teacher tenure is a nondelegable 
responsibility of boards of education. 
, m 
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contract by reviewing with the grievant all open music 
teacher positions which it determined to be appropriate to 
his qualifications and to give him the opportunity to select 
among them. The second directed that, at his choice, the 
grievant should be permitted to return to his former 
position. The Appellate Division affirmed the first part of 
the award but reversed the second, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed this decision. 
We find that the line between the two parts of the 
decision is not a clear one. On the one hand the court said: 
[T]he authority to assign and reassign 
teachers is essential to maintaining adequate 
standards in the classroom and is a 
nondelegable responsibility imposed upon the 
school superintendent subject to the approval 
of the board of education . . . . Public 
policy prevents a school district from 
bargaining away this responsibility . . . . 
(at 683) 
On the other hand it upheld that part of the arbitration 
award which gave the grievant the right to select among job 
opportunities for which he was qualified, saying: 
The arbitrator, therefore, acted within his 
powers under the agreement when he directed 
the district to follow the procedural rules by 
reviewing with the grievant all open music 
teachers positions appropriate to his 
qualifications and giving him the opportunity 
to select among them, (at 684) 
This is inconsistent with the court's language declaring 
assignment to be a nondelegable responsibility of school 
management. 
Board - U-7309 -5 
We find no statutory bar to the negotiation of a demand 
for seniority in the selection of assignments. Neither do we 
find any clear and unambiguous judicially declared public 
policy that such assignments are the nondelegable 
responsibility of a school district. As we have already 
indicated, the implications of Sweet Home CSD are unclear. 
Furthermore, we note that the Education Law considers 
seniority to be an appropriate criterion for establishing the 
4/ 
order of layoff and recall of tenured teachers.— 
In the absence of any clear statutory provision or public 
policy declaring assignment to be the nondelegable 
responsibility of a public employer, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ that the seniority demand herein is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. His decision is based upon our 
holding in White Plains PBA. 9 PERB ir3007 (1976), in which we 
said: 
Seniority clauses in contracts always 
inhibit the flexibility of employers, but 
they do involve terms and conditions of 
employment. It may be that there is. on 
the merits, a particularly persuasive case 
for restricting the use of seniority. . . . 
Whether or not this is so should be resolved 
by the parties during the negotiations 
process, (at 3009) 
.i/see Education Law §2585, subdivisions 3 and 4. 
Board - U-7309 -6 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: December 14, 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
-ar *_„£$_ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-2846 
ANGELINA SINICROPI. 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE, ESQ.. Nassau County Attorney, for 
Respondent 
ANGELINA SINICROPI. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed on August 18, 1977 by 
Angelina Sinicropi, a former employee of the Probation 
Department of Nassau County (County). It alleges that, on 
that day, the County seized a grievance form that Sinicropi 
was photocopying which complained about County conduct. The 
County acknowledged that it had confiscated the grievance 
form but it denied that it did so for the purpose of 
depriving Sinicropi of rights protected by the Taylor Law. 
According to the County, its Director of Probation (Director) 
took the forms to use as evidence against Sinicropi in a 
Board - U-2846 -2 
disciplinary proceeding it instituted the following day.— 
Sinicropi was discharged as a consequence of the 
disciplinary proceeding, and her appeal from that discharge 
2/ 
was dismissed by the courts.— 
In addition to the court appeal and the instant charge, 
Sinicropi filed a second charge (U-3691) in which she 
complained that her discharge was improperly motivated. The 
two charges were withdrawn by stipulation on April 10, 1979. 
to await resolution of the court action, and were reinstated 
on December 12. 1983, when the Court of Appeals upheld the 
discharge without reaching the improper practice issues. 
The administrative law judge (ALJ) then dismissed the 
charge in U-3691 on the ground that it was not timely, and we 
"yAmong other things, the disciplinary charge alleged: 
On August 18. 1977 at the main office of 
the Department of Probation County of 
Nassau contrary to specific instructions 
of the Director of Probation. Louis J. 
Milone. of the County of Nassau, you did 
utilize County paper and the County zerox 
[sic] machine for personal reasons beyond 
the scope of your employment, that upon 
being informed by Louis J. Milone, 
Director of Probation of the County of 
Nassau to cease and desist in the use of 
said zerox [sic] machine you did continue 
to do so, all of the aforesaid 
constituting insubordination of [sic] your 
part. 
^Sinicropi v. Bennett, 92 A.D.2d 309 (2d Dept., 
1981), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 918 (1983). 
Board - U-2846 -3 
3/ 
affirmed that determination.— After a hearing, he 
dismissed the instant charge on the ground that it merely 
specified a violation of §209-a.l(b). and that the record did 
not show that the County dominated CSEA, the union which 
represented Sinicropi, or meddled in CSEA's internal affairs. 
Sinicropi's exceptions allege 28 instances of improper 
conduct by the ALJ. this Board -. CSEA and the County. Many of 
these complain about our dismissal of U-3691. They, of 
course, are not considered by us because U-3691. having been 
decided, is no longer before this Board. Sinicropi also 
complains that the ALJ did not permit her to litigate the 
U-3691 issues in the instant proceeding, that too many 
adjournments were granted to the County in 1977 and 1978, 
which is before the stipulation of withdrawal, and that CSEA 
4/ 
had failed to represent her fairly in the two cases.— 
None of these are relevant to the basis of the ALJ's decision. 
We are, however, sympathetic to Sinicropi's assertion 
that it was by inadvertence that her "quickly drafted" charge 
omitted references to §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law. 
These are the provisions that prohibit a public employer from 
interfering with the protected rights of public employees 
1/County of Nassau. 17 PERB 1[3078 (1984) 
4/There is no charge against CSEA before this Board. 
- 9414 
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"for the purpose of depriving them of such rights;" or 
discriminating against them because of their exercise of such 
rights in order to discourage the exercise of such rights. 
Reviewing the record, we find that the instant case was 
litigated both by Sinicropi and the County, without 
objection, as if it alleged a violation of §209-a.l(a) and 
(c). Thus, the County was not prejudiced by Sinicropi's 
failure to cite those subdivisions. Moreover, Sinicropi, a 
pro se litigant, was thereby not made aware of the need to 
seek an amendment of her charge, an opportunity that would 
have been afforded her had she sought it. 
Accordingly, we do not affirm the ALJ's disposition of 
the charge herein on the basis of Sinicropi's citation of the 
wrong subdivision of the Taylor Law. The ALJ's reliance upon 
East Moriches Teachers Assn. 14 PERB 1f3056 (1981), is not 
compelling. There, we refused to base a decision upon facts 
which were not alleged in the charge. The mere failure to 
cite the precise subdivision of the Taylor Law that is 
applicable to facts which were alleged is a different matter. 
Having reached the merits of the charge, we, 
nevertheless, conclude that it must be dismissed. The County 
had acted within its rights when it told Sinicropi not to 
type or photocopy grievances or conduct other personal 
business during working time, and not to use County office 
equipment for such purposes. The record shows that Sinicropi 
disregarded this instruction, the instant grievance being 
9zl 
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typed and photocopied on office equipment. The Director told 
her to stop photocopying the grievance and he turned off the 
photocopy machine. Sinicropi disregarded these instructions, 
restarted the machine and continued to photocopy her 
grievance. At this point, the Director took the papers for 
use as evidence of insubordination in the disciplinary 
proceeding which ensued. 
On the facts before us. we do not find that the 
Director's action was motivated by an intention to interfere 
with Sinicropi's Taylor Law rights. While a public 
employer's seizure of grievance forms might, if unexplained, 
be sufficient to establish improper motivation, there is an 
adequate explanation here. Accordingly, no improper practice 
was shown to have occurred. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: December 14. 1984 
Albany, New York 
/M-t^uZ^^Ate*- 'Utt-?*-^^— 
Harold- R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
*J"~£JkSj 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 343. IAFF. AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7428 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS, 
Charging Party. 
GRASSO and GRASSO (Robert L. O'Keefe, Esq., of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DAVID H. WILDER. ESQ.. Assistant City Attorney, for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes before us on the exceptions of the 
City of Saratoga Springs to a decision of an administrative 
law judge (ALJ) finding a demand for emergency medical 
training to be a mandatory subject of negotiation.— 
i^This and a companion case which the ALJ dealt with 
in a consolidated decision (U-7461), involved demands 
submitted to an interest arbitrator. No exceptions were 
taken to the ALJ's resolution of the other specifications 
of the two charges. 
- 9417 
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The demand is: 
The City shall pay the cost of emergency 
medical technician (EMT) training on behalf of 
any member requesting such training, and 
provide such necessary release time off from 
duty without loss of pay as may be required in 
orderfor the members ----to attend such training 
sessions. 
The ALJ concluded that there are two parts to the demand. 
One is for paid time off to take emergency medical training. 
The other is that the City pay the cost of such training. She 
determined that time off with pay is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation whether or not the employer derives any benefit 
from the employees use of his time off. She also determined 
that reimbursement of the cost of training is simply a form of 
compensation and is. therefore, a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, whether or not the training is work related. 
In its exceptions, the City argues that the proposal would 
interfere "with the exercise of a management prerogative to 
determine whether, on a given work day. the employer will 
provide its employees with training or require them to perform 
their regular job duties." The City also argues that the 
demand is nonmandatory because it interferes with the 
management prerogative of deciding what training is required to 
assist employees in the performance of their regular job 
duties. 
We reject these arguments and affirm the conclusions of 
the ALJ. We do not read the first demand as affecting the 
r 941 
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right of the City to determine the number of employees it 
requires to work on any given day. To do so would logically 
indicate that a demand for personal leave is not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
The City's second argument is based upon a reading of the 
demand as indicating that the City will have to require 
emergency medical training. The demand does not do so. It 
merely permits an employee to seek such training. An employee 
might do so because it gives him a useful skill in dealing with 
emergencies involving family and friends no less than because 
the skill might be helpful in dealing with fire victims. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, 
and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: December 14, 1984 
Albany, New York 
•z^^-s^. '&61??*t^ln 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
' ±s istw <—ftf is!—i \— >- »-t **— —^ ,< 
David C. Randies, Member 
'JuT * > J*-J..«-> 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA and ONEIDA COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2773 
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 182. 
Intervener. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
On November 14, 1984, we affirmed a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director), ordering an election in a unit of all full-time 
employees of the Oneida County Sheriff's Department (17 
PERB ir3112). The matter had come to us on the exceptions 
of Teamsters Local No. 182 (Teamsters), the incumbent 
employee organization, which had asserted that the petition 
had been filed without any proper authorization from the 
employee organization on behalf of which it was submitted. 
The basis of this position was that the president of the 
- 9420 
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petitioner, who had filed the petition, and its directors, 
who had authorized the filing, were all elected improperly 
in that the election did not satisfy the "election 
mandates" of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law. 
The Director had rejected this argument on the ground 
that the election of petitioner's officers was an internal 
union matter and 
it would not effectuate the purposes of 
the Act to allow for collateral 
litigation into the internal affairs of 
the petitioner, which exercise will 
only subject the [representation] 
election process to lengthy delay. 
We affirmed the Director's decision, noting among 
other things, that "[t]here is no requirement in the Taylor 
Law that a union must be incorporated for its petition to 
be processed, nor that the president of the local file the 
petition." We also noted that whether or not he was 
properly elected pursuant to the Not-For-Profit Corporation 
Law was irrelevant in that the petitioner's president had 
been authorized to file the petition by its directors. 
The matter now comes to us on the Teamsters' motion 
for reconsideration. It argues that the authorization of 
the petitioner's directors is no more efficacious than the 
filing by the petitioner's president standing alone because 
both he and they were improperly elected. 
Board C-2773 -3 
Having considered this argument of the Teamsters, we 
nevertheless adhere to our earlier decision. We do so for 
the reasons set forth in the Director's decision. Moreover, 
as we said in our earlier decision: 
[I]f a majority of the petitioner's members 
donot" support the filing of the petition* 
they will have the opportunity of 
demonstrating their position by denying it 
their support in the election ordered by the 
Director. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and 
it hereby is, denied 
DATED: December 14, 19 84 
Albany, New York 
'&^*-^£? 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
™y<£ 
avid C. Randies, ^Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF HAMBURG. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO- C-283 6 
HAMBURG POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Hamburg Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the Police 
Department of the Village. 
Excluded: Part-time employees, civilian 
employees, seasonal employees, the 
Chief and Assistant Chief of the 
Department, and employees having the 
rank of Captain or Lieutenant. 
Certification - C-2836 page 2 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Hamburg Police Benevolent 
Association and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: December 14, 1984 
Albany, New York 
» A^iu. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
#3B-12/14/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF GUILDERLAND, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2817 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC., LOCAL 1000. AFSCME/AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME/AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Dispatchers, Animal Control Officers, 
and Clerk Typist. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terras and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of. and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: December 14, 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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